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Footnotes
1. 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013).
2. 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (stating that the Court will defer to an
administrative agency’s interpretation of its own regulations
unless that interpretation is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation”) (internal quotation omitted).
3. Justice Breyer recused himself because his brother, U.S. District
Judge Charles Breyer, was sitting by designation on the Ninth Cir-
cuit panel that heard the case below.
4. Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1339, 1344 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
5. Id. at 1341 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
6. 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
7. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (explaining that, when Congress dele-
gates the administration of a federal statute to an agency but does
not clearly indicate its intentions with respect to a particular issue
arising under that statute, a court may not substitute its own
interpretation of the statute for the reasonable interpretation of
the agency itself).
8. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii).
9. City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1868.
10. Id. at 1870.
11. Id. at 1870-71.
The Supreme Court’s October 2012 Term likely will beremembered best for the Justices’ landmark ruling inUnited States v. Windsor, striking down Section 3 of the
Defense of Marriage Act, and for the jurisdictional ruling in
Hollingsworth v. Perry that helped to reopen the door for same-
sex marriages in California. Many also will long remember
Shelby County v. Holder, invalidating Section 4 of the Voting
Rights Act and thereby freeing a number of states and localities
from the preclearance requirements under which they had
operated for decades. Crowded behind those headline-domi-
nating decisions are a host of other broadly consequential rul-
ings on issues ranging from racial preferences in higher educa-
tion, to ratcheting up the requirements for voter registration,
to seeking standing in federal court on the basis of anticipated
injuries. I briefly review the Court’s most noteworthy civil
decisions here, letting a set of alphabetized headings dictate
the order in which I take them up.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AUER DEFERENCE
The Court’s holding in Decker v. Northwest Environmental
Defense Center1 is not likely to be of much interest outside the
world of environmental-law specialists, but the case served as
a vehicle for three Justices to signal an issue of potentially
enormous significance in the larger world of administrative
law. Decker concerned a dispute about the need for National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permits covering
storm water flowing off logging roads into nearby rivers. Cit-
ing Auer v. Robbins,2 the Court deferred to the Environmental
Protection Agency’s interpretation of its own regulations and
held that permits were not required.3 It is the continued via-
bility of Auer deference that three Justices questioned.
The leading skeptic was Justice Scalia, who wrote separately
to declare that “[e]nough is enough” and that the time has
come “for us to presume (to coin a phrase) that an agency says
in a rule what it means, and means in a rule what it says
there.”4 Calling Auer deference “a dangerous permission slip
for the arrogation of power,” Justice Scalia argued that it vio-
lates “a fundamental principle of separation of powers—that
the power to write a law and the power to interpret it cannot
rest in the same hands.”5 Joined by Justice Alito, Chief Justice
Roberts wrote separately to say that it would be inappropriate
to take on the question of Auer deference in this case because
it had not been thoroughly argued by the parties, but that the
issue might indeed merit the Court’s attention in the future.
CHEVRON DEFERENCE
Two months later, in City of Arlington v. FCC,6 Justice Scalia
led a majority of the Court in defending a different species of
interpretive deference, with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Kennedy and Alito warning in dissent about the dangers of
expanding administrative agencies’ already vast powers. The
issue in City of Arlington was whether the Federal Communi-
cations Commission’s interpretation of its own statutory juris-
diction was entitled to Chevron deference.7 Under federal statu-
tory law, state and local zoning authorities must respond
“within a reasonable period of time” when providers of wire-
less telecommunications seek approval to build the towers and
antennas that their services require.8 After the FCC specified
the number of days within which zoning authorities ordinarily
must respond to siting applications, the City of Arlington,
Texas, and other municipalities sought judicial review, arguing
that the FCC lacked the authority to say what Congress meant
by “reasonable period of time.” The FCC contended that it
held the power to resolve the ambiguity, and that its determi-
nation that it possessed this interpretive power was itself enti-
tled to Chevron deference.
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia concluded that
Chevron deference is indeed appropriate for agencies’ interpre-
tations of statutory ambiguities concerning the scope of their
own authority. He explained that the proposed distinction
between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional statutory inter-
pretations is “a mirage,”9 “an empty distraction,”10 and a dis-
tinction that would require federal judges to engage in
“waste[ful] . . . mental acrobatics” akin to those of a “haruspex,
sifting the entrails of vast statutory schemes.”11 In every case
concerning an agency’s statutory interpretations, the Court
said, the question is always the same: has the agency “gone
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beyond what Congress has permitted it to do”?12
Joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito, Chief Justice Roberts
dissented, expressing grave reservations about the broad scope
of administrative agencies’ powers in modern American gov-
ernment. The Chief Justice argued that, with “hundreds of fed-
eral agencies poking into every nook and cranny of [the aver-
age citizen’s] daily life,” the Court should be loath to expand
agencies’ powers still further.13 “An agency interpretation war-
rants [Chevron] deference,” the Chief Justice wrote, “only if
Congress has delegated authority to definitively interpret a
particular ambiguity in a particular manner. Whether Congress
has done so must be determined by the court on its own before
Chevron can apply.”14
ARBITRATION
HONORING THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
In three rulings handed down during the prior Term,15 the
Court expressed frustration with lower courts for failing to fol-
low the requirements of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). In
November 2012, the Court picked up where it left off by unan-
imously reversing a judgment of the Oklahoma Supreme Court
in Nitro-Lift Technologies, LLC v. Howard.16 Nitro-Lift had
entered into contracts with two of its employees. Those con-
tracts contained noncompetition clauses, as well as clauses
requiring arbitration to settle any differences that might arise
between the parties. After the employees left Nitro-Lift to work
for a competitor, Nitro-Lift sought to enforce the noncompeti-
tion agreements through arbitration. The employees, however,
went to state court seeking a declaration that the noncompeti-
tion agreements were unenforceable under state law. The Okla-
homa Supreme Court found that the noncompetition agree-
ments were “void and unenforceable as against Oklahoma’s
public policy.”17 In a unanimous per curiam ruling, the
Supreme Court reversed, explaining that the FAA permitted
the state courts to pass judgment on the validity of the arbitra-
tion provisions themselves, but—having accepted the trial
court’s determination that those provisions were valid—the
Oklahoma Supreme Court improperly “assumed the arbitra-
tor’s role by declaring the
noncompetition agreements
null and void.”18
CLASS ARBITRATION
In two cases last Term, the
Court addressed issues relat-
ing to class arbitration. Build-
ing on the previously estab-
lished principle that “a party
may not be compelled . . . to
submit to class arbitration
unless there is a contractual
basis for concluding that the
party agreed to do so,”19 the
Court in Oxford Health Plans
LLC v. Sutter20 confronted a dispute between a health-insur-
ance company and a proposed class of physicians. On two sep-
arate occasions, the insurer had asked an arbitrator to deter-
mine whether the insurer and the physicians had agreed upon
class arbitration (as some of the physicians contended), and on
both occasions the arbitrator determined that they had. The
insurer then asked a federal court to vacate the arbitrator’s
determination under Section 10(a)(4) of the FAA, arguing that
the arbitrator had “exceeded [his] powers.”21
Led by Justice Kagan, the Court unanimously ruled that it
would be inappropriate to disturb the arbitrator’s finding that
class arbitration was within the scope of the parties’ agreement.
The Court stressed that it was not necessarily agreeing with the
arbitrator’s reading of the contract.22 Rather, the Justices’ deci-
sion turned on the narrow scope of judicial review:
All we say is that convincing a court of an arbitrator’s
error—even a grave error—is not enough. So long as the
arbitrator was “arguably construing” the contract—
which this one was—a court may not correct his mis-
takes under § 10(a)(4). The potential for those mistakes
is the price of agreeing to arbitration.23
12. Id. at 1869.
13. Id. at 1879 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). The majority did not
believe its ruling expanded agencies’ power. See, e.g., id. at 1872
(“The U.S. Reports are shot through with applications of Chevron
to agencies’ constructions of the scope of their own jurisdic-
tion.”).
14. Id. at 1883 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Justice Breyer wrote sepa-
rately. Although he denominated his opinion a concurrence in
part and a concurrence in the judgment, he substantively aligned
himself, in part, with the dissent. See, e.g., id. at 1876 (“The ques-
tion whether Congress has delegated to an agency the authority to
provide an interpretation that carries the force of law is for the
judge to answer independently.”).
15. CompuCredit v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012); Marmet
Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012); KPMG
LLP v. Cocchi, 132 S. Ct. 23 (2011).
16. 133 S. Ct. 500 (2012) (per curiam).
17. Howard v. Nitro-Lift Technologies, LLC, 273 P.3d 20, 27 (Okla.
2011).
18. Nitro-Lift Technologies, 133 S. Ct. at 503.
19. Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010)
(emphasis omitted).
20. 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013).
21. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (authorizing federal courts to vacate arbitra-
tors’ awards “where the arbitrators exceeded their powers”).
22. Joined by Justice Thomas, Justice Alito filed a brief concurrence,
underscoring the implausibility of the arbitrator’s finding on the
merits and indicating that—absent a decision like the one the
insurer made here to submit the issue to the arbitrator in the first
instance—courts should be reluctant to find that the availability
of class arbitration is indeed an issue for arbitrators to decide. In
her opinion for the Court, Justice Kagan emphasized that the
Court has not yet determined whether “the availability of class
arbitration is a so-called ‘question of arbitrability’” that courts
ordinarily can review de novo. See Oxford Health Plans, 133 S. Ct.
at 2068 n.2.
23. Id. at 2070 (quoting E. Associated Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers,
531 U.S. 57, 62 (2000)).
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The class-arbitration issue in
American Express Co. v. Italian
Colors Restaurant24 proved to be
more controversial. Merchants
who accepted American Express
(Amex) cards brought a class-
action lawsuit against the com-
pany, arguing that Amex violated
federal antitrust laws by using its
monopoly power in the market
for charge cards to force the mer-
chants to pay above-market fees
for transactions involving Amex
credit cards. Amex sought to
compel individual arbitration
pursuant to a contractual arbitra-
tion clause, pointing out that the merchants not only had
agreed to arbitrate any claims they might have against the com-
pany, but also that they had waived their ability to pursue their
claims as a class. The merchants objected, arguing that their
individual best-case recoveries would amount to only a frac-
tion of the costs they each would have to incur to prove the
merits of their antitrust claims. To preclude them from collec-
tively pursuing their claims in court, they argued, thus would
frustrate the purposes of the antitrust laws by effectively
shielding Amex from liability.
Led by Justice Scalia, a majority of the Court ruled in favor
of Amex, stating that “the antitrust laws do not guarantee an
affordable procedural path to the vindication of every claim.”25
The Court acknowledged that, in past cases, it had developed
an “effective vindication” doctrine, under which a court may
invalidate an arbitration agreement if it amounts to “‘a
prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory reme-
dies.’” 26 The Court found, however, that “the fact that it is not
worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does
not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that rem-
edy.”27 Joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, Justice Kagan
dissented, arguing that the case fell squarely within the effec-
tive-vindication doctrine.
COPYRIGHTS: THE FIRST-SALE DOCTRINE
In Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,28 the Court finally
brought clarity to the application of the first-sale doctrine to
goods manufactured abroad—an issue on which it had reached
an unilluminating 4-4 split in 2010.29 Under the Copyright
Act, a copyright owner generally has the exclusive right to dis-
tribute copies of the copyrighted work. Under Section 109(a)
of the Act, however, the copyright owner can only control the
first sale of a given copy—once someone else has become the
copy’s lawful owner, that new owner can sell or distribute the
copy however he or she would like.
The first-sale doctrine’s application to goods manufactured
within the United States is clear. But what about goods manu-
factured abroad? Suppose, for example, that a book publisher
charges more for a copyrighted textbook in one region of the
world than another, and wants to prevent a profit seeker from
buying copies in the inexpensive region and then selling those
copies in the more expensive region at prices somewhat lower
than those charged by the publisher itself. Does the first-sale
doctrine cut off the publisher’s ability to complain? By a 6-3
vote, the Kirtsaeng Court answered that question in the affir-
mative. Led by Justice Breyer, a majority found no evidence
that, when settling upon the language of Section 109(a), Con-
gress intended to impose a geographical restriction on the first-
sale-doctrine’s application.30 Manufacturers of copyrighted
works who wish to segment their international markets will
now likely take their fight to Congress. 
FEDERAL JURISDICTION
THE MARRIAGE CASES
The two intensely watched marriage cases that the Court
decided last Term—Hollingsworth v. Perry31 and United States v.
Windsor32—yielded the Term’s highest-profile jurisdictional
rulings. The facts in Hollingsworth will still be fresh in most
readers’ minds. In the fall of 2008, California voters approved
Proposition 8, banning same-sex marriage. When two same-
sex couples filed a lawsuit challenging Prop 8’s constitutional-
ity, California officials refused to defend it. In place of those
officials, the district court permitted Dennis Hollingsworth
and others who had led the charge on Prop 8 (collectively
referred to here as “Hollingsworth”) to intervene as parties.
Following a trial, the district court declared Prop 8 unconsti-
tutional. When Hollingsworth appealed, the Ninth Circuit
asked the California Supreme Court to weigh in on whether
Hollingsworth had the power to defend Prop 8 on the state’s
behalf. After California’s high court confirmed that he did, the
Ninth Circuit took jurisdiction and affirmed the district court’s
ruling (albeit on grounds narrower than those that the district
court had cited). The Court granted Hollingsworth’s petition
for certiorari, asking the parties to brief both the merits and the
question of Hollingsworth’s standing.
The Justices ultimately divided 5-4, although not along
familiar ideological lines. Disposing of the case entirely on
jurisdictional grounds, Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the
majority, joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Kagan. The Court first determined that Hollingsworth himself
had no personal stake in the case; his only interest was a gen-
eralized desire “to vindicate the constitutional validity of a
[A] majority of
the court ruled in
favor of Amex,
stating that “the
antitrust laws do
not guarantee
an affordable
procedural path
to the 
vindication of
every claim.”
24. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
25. Id. at 2309.
26. Id. at 2310 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985)).
27. Id. at 2311.
28. 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013).
29. See Costco Wholesale Corp v. Omega, S.A., 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010).
Justice Kagan recused herself in Costco.
30. Joined by Justice Kennedy and (in part) by Justice Scalia, Justice
Ginsburg dissented. She argued, inter alia, that the Court’s ruling
was at odds with the position taken by the United States in inter-
national negotiations, and thus “risks undermining the United
States’ credibility on the world stage.” Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at
1385 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
31. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
32. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
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33. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2662.
34. Id. at 2666.
35. Id. at 2668 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 2671 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
37. BLAG’s decision to intervene fell along party lines, with the three
Republican members favoring the move and the two Democrats
opposing it.
38. 133 S. Ct. at 2688.
39. Id. at 2714 (Alito, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 2698 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 2700 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 2698 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion).
43. 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
generally applicable California law.”33 Turning to the more dif-
ficult legal question, the majority found that Hollingsworth
did not have standing to assert the interests of the State of Cal-
ifornia, notwithstanding the California Supreme Court’s find-
ing to the contrary. Hollingsworth had argued that he was
authorized to speak as an agent of the people of California, but
the Court disagreed, pointing out that Hollingsworth and his
fellow Prop 8 proponents “answer to no one; they decide for
themselves, with no review, what arguments to make and how
to make them,” they are not subject to removal, and they owe
no fiduciary obligations to the people of California.34
Joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, and Sotomayor, Justice
Kennedy dissented, arguing that the California Supreme Court’s
findings regarding Hollingsworth’s power to speak for the state
were “fully sufficient to establish the standing and adversity
that are requisites for justiciability under Article III.”35 Far from
finding Hollingsworth’s autonomy problematic, Justice
Kennedy argued that Hollingsworth’s independence was inte-
gral to California’s embrace of ballot initiatives.  The initiative
system provides Californians with a vehicle for circumventing
state officials, Justice Kennedy said, and it undermines that sys-
tem “if the very officials the initiative process seeks to circum-
vent are the only parties who can defend an enacted initiative
when it is challenged in a legal proceeding.”36
In Windsor, the fight was over Section 3 of the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA). Section 3 stated that, for purposes of all
federal statutory and administrative law, the term “marriage”
referred only to heterosexual unions and the term “spouse”
referred only to individuals joined in such unions. Pursuant to
federal tax laws and DOMA, the federal government collected
estate taxes totaling more than $360,000 from Edith Windsor
after Windsor’s female spouse died. Windsor filed suit alleging
a violation of her equal-protection rights, accurately pointing
out that she would not have been required to pay those federal
taxes if her spouse had been a man. Just as California officials
declined to defend Prop 8 in Hollingsworth, the Obama Admin-
istration declined to defend DOMA but said that it would con-
tinue to obey that legislation and would withhold the disputed
funds pending completion of the judicial proceedings. Given
the Executive’s decision not to defend Section 3, the House of
Representative’s Bipartisan Leadership Advisory Group (BLAG)
petitioned to intervene to defend the legislation.37 The district
court granted BLAG’s petition, but ultimately ruled in Wind-
sor’s favor on the merits. After the Second Circuit affirmed, both
the United States and BLAG petitioned for certiorari—the
United States seeking affirmance and BLAG seeking reversal.
The Court granted the United States’ petition, asking the parties
to address both the constitutionality of Section 3 and whether
the Court had jurisdiction to say anything about the matter.
Joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan,
Justice Kennedy wrote for the
majority, finding that the Court had
jurisdiction. The Court distin-
guished between standing require-
ments imposed by Article III and
those imposed by the Court in the
name of prudence. In this case, Jus-
tice Kennedy wrote, the United
States satisfied the requirements of
Article III (notwithstanding its
agreement with the Second Circuit
and with Windsor) because the
national treasury stood to lose the
money that Windsor contended was
rightly hers. The Court acknowl-
edged that a prevailing party ordinarily lacks standing to appeal,
but said that this was a prudential concern rather than a dictate
of Article III. The Court concluded that it was appropriate to
take jurisdiction because BLAG—even if not formally a proper
party to the action—had provided the Court with a “sharp
adversarial presentation of the issues,”38 and vast resources
would have to be spent on Section 3 litigation involving thou-
sands of people across the country if the Court refused to hear
Windsor’s case. (I discuss the Court’s ruling on the merits else-
where in this overview, under the “Fifth Amendment” heading.)
Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion in Windsor, but he
agreed that the Court had jurisdiction. For Justice Alito, the
key to the Court’s power to hear the case lay in BLAG’s inter-
vention and vigorous advocacy on DOMA’s behalf. “[I]n the
narrow category of cases in which a court strikes down an Act
of Congress and the Executive declines to defend the Act,” he
wrote, “Congress both has standing to defend the undefended
statute and is a proper party to do so.”39
Finding no jurisdiction, Justice Scalia dissented, joined by
Justice Thomas and, in part, by Chief Justice Roberts. Accus-
ing the majority of making a “jaw-dropping” assertion of judi-
cial authority,40 Justice Scalia said that the Court had never
before agreed to decide a legal question “when every party
agrees with both its nominal opponent and the court below on
that question’s answer.”41 He argued that the majority “envi-
sions a Supreme Court standing (or rather enthroned) at the
apex of government, empowered to decide all constitutional
questions, always and everywhere ‘primary’ in its role.”42
STANDING AND FUTURE INJURIES
Although overshadowed by Hollingsworth and Windsor,
another broadly consequential jurisdictional ruling came
down in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA.43 In that case,
attorneys, journalists, human-rights workers, and others
sought declaratory and injunctive relief concerning 50 U.S.C.
Hollingsworth
had argued 
that he was 
authorized to
speak as an
agent of the
people of 
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the Court 
disagreed . . . .
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44. The legislation defines “United States persons” as citizens of the
United States, aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence,
and certain corporations and associations. See 50 U.S.C. §
1801(i).
45. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495
U.S. 149, 158 (1990), and other authorities).
46. Id. at 1148. Justice Alito explained that the plaintiffs were assum-
ing that the government would indeed attempt to target individu-
als with whom the plaintiffs were in contact, that the government
would rely upon Section 1881a rather than another source of sur-
veillance authority, that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court would approve the government’s surveillance request, that
the government would successfully intercept some of the targets’
communications, and that the plaintiffs would be parties to some
of those intercepted communications. 
47. Id. at 1150 n.5 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms,
130 S. Ct. 2743, 2754-55 (2010)).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1155 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 1160 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
51. Cf. id.at 1147 (“[W]e have often found a lack of standing in cases
in which the Judiciary has been requested to review actions of the
political branches in the fields of intelligence gathering and for-
eign affairs . . . .”).
52. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
53. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (“The district courts shall have original juris-
diction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”).
54. The United States subsequently granted the plaintiffs political asy-
lum. The plaintiffs live in the United States today.
55. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
Justice Breyer was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and
Kagan.
§ 1881a, a provision of the FISA
Amendments Act of 2008. Under
Section 1881a, the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Court may grant
the Attorney General and the Direc-
tor of National Intelligence permis-
sion to conduct surveillance on the
electronic communications of indi-
viduals who both are not “United
States persons” and are reasonably
believed to be located outside the
country, even if the government does
not precisely specify the locations
where the surveillance will occur.44 The plaintiffs claimed that
Section 1881a violates the First and Fourth Amendments, Arti-
cle III, and the separation of powers.
To demonstrate that they had standing to challenge the legis-
lation’s constitutionality, Amnesty International USA and the
other plaintiffs advanced two theories of harm. First, they
argued that there was an “objectively reasonable likelihood” that
the government would conduct surveillance on some of the
individuals with whom the plaintiffs would have future com-
munications. Second, they said that the fear of such surveillance
was already prompting them to engage in costly measures aimed
at avoiding government interception, such as traveling long dis-
tances to communicate with their contacts in person.
Dividing 5-4 along familiar lines, the Court held that the
plaintiffs lacked standing. Writing for the majority, Justice
Alito invoked the Court’s prior indication that “‘threatened
injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in
fact.’”45 In the eyes of the majority, the plaintiffs’ first theory of
harm failed to meet that stringent requirement because it relied
upon “a highly attenuated chain of possibilities.”46 With
respect to the plaintiffs’ second theory of harm, the Court
found that the plaintiffs could not manufacture standing by
incurring present-day costs aimed at avoiding future specula-
tive harms. Justice Alito conceded in a footnote that some of
the Court’s prior standing cases used language less daunting
than “certainly impending” to characterize the standard the
Court uses to evaluate claims of future injuries; sometimes, he
acknowledged, the Court has said there must be “a ‘substantial
risk’ that the harm will occur.”47 The majority concluded that,
“to the extent that the ‘substantial risk’ standard is relevant and
is distinct from the ‘clearly impending’ requirement,” the
plaintiffs had failed to meet it.48
Writing for the dissent, Justice Breyer concluded that the
harms claimed by the plaintiffs were “as likely to take place as
are most future events that commonsense inference and ordi-
nary knowledge of human nature tell us will happen.”49 The
dissent argued that the majority’s insistence upon certainty con-
flicted with numerous prior cases in which federal courts have
adjudicated “actions for injunctions and for declaratory relief
aimed at preventing future activities that are reasonably likely
or highly likely, but not absolutely certain, to take place. ”50
In future cases, courts and litigants will scrutinize the
majority’s discussion of the two competing standards. Did the
Clapper Court stress the “certainly impending” language
because issues of national security were at stake?51 Or does
Clapper instead signal that five Justices might now be
inclined to demand a more compelling showing in all cases
in which plaintiffs seek standing on the strength of feared
future harm?
THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,52 the Court found
that the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) does not provide jurisdiction
over causes of action alleging violations of the law of nations
occurring within other sovereigns’ territories.53 Relying upon
the ATS for federal jurisdiction, Nigerian nationals now living
in the United States had filed suit against Royal Dutch Petro-
leum Company and two other entities. The plaintiffs alleged
that, after they began to protest the environmental effects of
the defendants’ oil-exploration activities in Nigeria, the defen-
dants helped the Nigerian Government brutally maltreat the
plaintiffs in violation of the law of nations.54 Led by Chief Jus-
tice Roberts, the Court ruled that there was nothing in the text
or history of the ATS to rebut the presumption against extrater-
ritorial application of federal statutes. Joined by three col-
leagues, Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment, arguing that
the ATS would have provided jurisdiction if (contrary to fact)
the defendants’ conduct had “substantially and adversely
affect[ed] an important American national interest.”55
In future cases,
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56. 133 S. Ct. 721 (2013).
57. Id. at 727 (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.
Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190 (2000)).
58. Id. at 728.
59. 133 S. Ct. 1017 (2012).
60. Art. 1, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-11, at 7.
61. See id. Art. 3; see also 42 U.S.C. § 11603(a) (granting concurrent
jurisdiction to federal and state courts); id. § 11603(d) (directing
courts to decide these cases “in accordance with the Conven-
tion”).
62. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. at 1025.
63. 133 S. Ct. 1345 (2013).
64. 133 S. Ct. 1523 (2013).
65. Id. at 1533 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
66. Collective actions under the Fair Labor Standards Act bear a
resemblance to class actions but are a different procedural animal.
See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (authorizing “one or more employees [to
sue] for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employ-
ees similarly situated”).
COVENANTS NOT TO SUE
In Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc.,56 the Court unanimously ruled
that a defendant’s counterclaim had been mooted by the plain-
tiff’s covenant not to sue. Nike had initiated the litigation,
alleging that two lines of shoes marketed by Already infringed
a Nike trademark. Already counterclaimed, contending that
Nike’s trademark was invalid. Months later, Nike gave Already
a “Covenant Not to Sue,” promising not to bring any claim
against Already concerning Already’s existing designs or any
future designs that are “colorable imitations” of Already’s exist-
ing products. On the strength of that covenant, Nike moved to
dismiss not only its own claim, but Already’s counterclaim, as
well. Already resisted, contending that there was still a live dis-
pute between the parties.
Writing for the full Court, Chief Justice Roberts identified
the relevant test: “[O]ur cases have explained that ‘a defendant
claiming that its voluntary compliance moots a case bears the
formidable burden of showing that it is absolutely clear the
allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected
to recur.’”57 The Court found that Nike had satisfied that bur-
den here. By its very terms, the covenant was “uncondi-
tional[]” and “irrevocabl[e],”58 and Already had failed to iden-
tify any realistic circumstance in which it might infringe upon
Nike’s trademark and yet not be protected by the covenant.
THE INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION REMEDIES
ACT
In Chafin v. Chafin,59 the Court addressed a jurisdictional
matter concerning the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects
of International Child Abduction (the Convention) and its
domestic implementing legislation, the International Child
Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA). The Convention aims to
ensure “the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to
or retained in any Contracting State.”60 ICARA gives state and
federal courts concurrent jurisdiction to grant a petition for a
child’s return to the country in which he or she “was habitu-
ally resident immediately before the [wrongful] removal or
retention.”61 In Chafin, the district court had ruled that Mr.
Chafin was wrongfully retaining his daughter in the United
States and that the girl’s country of habitual residence was
Scotland, where she previously had lived with her mother, Ms.
Chafin. Within hours of the ruling, Ms. Chafin and her daugh-
ter were on a plane bound for Scotland. Mr. Chafin appealed to
the Eleventh Circuit, but the appellate court dismissed the
appeal as moot, reasoning that it was powerless to secure the
child’s return from a foreign country.
The Court unanimously reversed. Writing for the Court,
Chief Justice Roberts explained that whether the appellate
court could secure the child’s
return to the United States was
a matter separate from whether
the Chafins’ dispute continued
to present a live controversy.
“Enforcement of the order may
be uncertain if Ms. Chafin
chooses to defy it,” the Chief
Justice wrote, “but such uncer-
tainty does not typically render
cases moot.”62
THE CLASS ACTION 
FAIRNESS ACT
In Standard Fire Insurance
Co. v. Knowles,63 the Court unanimously held that a would-be
class-action plaintiff cannot defeat federal jurisdiction under
the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) by stipulating, before
class certification, that the class will seek damages less than
CAFA’s $5 million jurisdictional threshold. Writing for the
Court, Justice Breyer acknowledged that, by stipulating to
damages that fall below the applicable amount-in-controversy
requirement, an individual plaintiff can indeed defeat federal
jurisdiction. The difference here, Justice Breyer explained, was
that the named plaintiff lacked the authority to bind absent
members of the proposed class because the class had not yet
been certified.
MOOTNESS AND OFFERS OF JUDGMENT
Whether Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk64 merits men-
tion here depends in part on whether Justice Kagan was right
when, in dissent, she advised readers to “[f]eel free to relegate
the majority’s decision to the furthest reaches of your mind:
The situation it addresses should never arise again.”65 Readers
may decide for themselves. Laura Symczyk filed a “collective
action”66 on behalf of herself and other employees, charging
that their employer had violated the Fair Labor Standards Act
by refusing to compensate them for some of the time they had
worked. The employer served an offer of judgment upon Sym-
czyk, offering to pay all of her damages, fees, and costs, but
Symczyk declined to accept. The employer then moved to dis-
miss the case as moot. The Third Circuit found that Symczyk’s
individual claim was indeed moot but that the larger collective
action was not. When the employer took the case to the
Supreme Court, Symczyk failed to seek certiorari on the Third
Circuit’s finding that her individual claim no longer presented
a live controversy.
Writing for the five-member majority, Justice Thomas said
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75. Id. at 2716 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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77. 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013). Justice Kagan recused herself.
78. 22 U.S.C. § 7631(f).
that, given Symczyk’s failure to
preserve her right to challenge
the lower court’s mootness ruling,
the Court would assume, without
deciding, that her individual
claim was indeed moot. Because
no other employee had opted in
as a plaintiff, Justice Thomas
wrote, Symczyk’s entire lawsuit
“became moot when her individ-
ual claim became moot, because
she lacked any personal interest
in representing others in this
action.”67 Writing for the four
dissenters, Justice Kagan argued
that the starting premise of the
Court’s ruling was “bogus”
because Symczyk’s refusal to
accept her employer’s offer of judgment did not suffice to moot
her individual claim: after Symczyk refused to accept the offer,
she continued to have the same personal stake in the litigation
that she had before the offer of judgment was made. Because
cases like Symczyk’s should never become moot in the future,
she wrote, courts should “never need to reach the issue the
majority resolves.”68 Justice Kagan passed along some advice:
“[A] friendly suggestion to the Third Circuit: Rethink your
mootness-by-unaccepted-offer theory. And a note to all other
courts of appeals: Don’t try this at home.”69
FIFTH AMENDMENT: DOMA AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
As explained above in the summary of the Court’s leading
jurisdictional rulings this past Term, Justice Kennedy joined
with the Court’s four Democratic appointees in Windsor, ruling
that the Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the constitution-
ality of Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). The
same coalition of Justices concluded that Section 3 was uncon-
stitutional. Justice Kennedy devoted several paragraphs to the
proposition that, “[b]y history and tradition the definition and
regulation of marriage . . . has been treated as being within the
authority and realm of the separate States.”70 The majority ulti-
mately concluded, however, that it was unnecessary to decide
whether Section 3 violated constitutional principles of federal-
ism. Instead, the Court used its observations about states’ tra-
ditional prerogatives to help fuel its finding that Section 3 vio-
lated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and its
implicit principles of equality.
The majority found that states choosing to recognize same-
sex marriages had conferred upon those couples “a dignity and
status of immense import.”71 Through DOMA, Justice
Kennedy wrote, Congress had sought “to injure the very class
[that New York and other states recognizing same-sex mar-
riages have sought] to protect.”72 In the eyes of the majority,
“DOMA’s unusual deviation from the usual tradition of recog-
nizing and accepting state definitions of marriage” helped to
reveal that both the purpose and the effect of that legislation
was “to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a
stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages made law-
ful by the unquestioned authority of the States.”73 Justice
Kennedy said that Section 3 “demeans” same-sex couples and
“humiliates” their children.74 Such legislation, the Court
found, violates the protections afforded to same-sex couples by
the Fifth Amendment. Although the Court did not hold that
same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marry, there is
much in the Court’s decision that could easily lay the ground-
work for such a ruling further down the road.
Chief Justice Roberts filed a brief dissent, emphasizing that
the Court was not reaching the question of whether a state
today may refuse to permit same-sex marriages. Justice Alito
also dissented, joined in relevant part by Justice Thomas, argu-
ing that the majority’s analysis was driven by an ill-founded
conception of substantive due process and that “the Constitu-
tion simply does not speak to the issue of same-sex mar-
riage.”75 The most strongly worded dissent, however, was filed
by Justice Scalia and joined in relevant part by Justice Thomas.
Justice Scalia accused the majority of deciding the case based
upon a confused hash of pronouncements regarding federal-
ism, due process, and equality, which ultimately boiled down
to an indefensible conception of substantive due process. Jus-
tice Scalia argued that Section 3 should be given nothing more
stringent than rational-basis review and that it could easily sur-
vive it, based upon such governmental objectives as avoiding
difficult choice-of-law issues and honoring prior Congresses’
legislative intentions. He said that the majority had merely
supplanted what it saw as a “hateful moral judgment” with a
morality that the majority deemed “superior,”76 and he unhap-
pily predicted that a majority of the Court will later follow the
path foreshadowed by much of Justice Kennedy’s language and
flatly demand that all states permit same-sex couples to marry.
FIRST AMENDMENT: SPEECH
By a 6-2 vote in Agency for International Development v.
Alliance for Open Society International, Inc.,77 the Court invali-
dated a provision of the United States Leadership Against
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (the Leader-
ship Act). Through that legislation, the federal government
provides billions of dollars to nongovernmental organizations
to help globally combat the ailments signified in the statute’s
title. As a condition of receipt of Leadership Act funds, how-
ever, Congress required grant-seeking organizations to adopt
“a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex traffick-
ing.”78 A group of domestic organizations challenged the law,
explaining that while they did not favor prostitution, they
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feared that adopting the required policy would alienate some
of the governments and prostitutes with whom they worked. 
With Chief Justice Roberts writing for the majority, the
Court held that the challenged condition violated the organiza-
tions’ First Amendment speech rights. Chief Justice Roberts
explained that, in some cases, an organization that objects to a
condition on the receipt of federal funds is left to secure its own
remedy by simply declining the funds, while in other cases the
Court has found that funding conditions unconstitutionally
burden recipients’ speech rights. Acknowledging that the line
between the two classes of cases “is hardly clear,” the Court said
that the distinction “is between conditions that define the lim-
its of the government spending program . . . and conditions that
seek to leverage funding to regulate speech outside the con-
tours of the program itself.”79 Here, the Court found that the
spending condition went beyond defining Congress’s program,
by trying to restrict what a grant recipient could say “when par-
ticipating in activities on its own time and dime.”80
Joined by Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia dissented, arguing
that “a central part of the Government’s HIV/AIDS strategy is
the suppression of prostitution, by which HIV is transmitted.
It is entirely reasonable to admit to participation in the pro-
gram only those who believe in that goal.”81 The “real evil” of
the majority’s ruling, Justice Scalia wrote, is that it exposes the
federal government to lawsuits whenever it “distinguish[es]
between [grant] applicants on a relevant ideological ground.”82
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Proponents of race-conscious admissions decisions at pub-
lic colleges and universities may have breathed at least a shal-
low sigh of relief when—more than eight months after oral
argument—the Court in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin
finally handed down its ruling.83 By using a race-neutral
admissions calculus and by automatically offering admission
to all high-school students graduating in the top 10% of their
respective classes, the university had been achieving a measure
of diversity in its undergraduate population.84 Concluding that
it needed still more racial diversity to achieve its objectives, the
university added race to the array of factors that it would
explicitly consider when making at least some of its admis-
sions decisions. Abigail Fisher, a white applicant, was there-
after denied admission and filed suit.
Rather than strike down the university’s use of race in its
admissions decisions (as many predicted), the Court opted by a
7-1 vote to remand the case to the Fifth Circuit for a second
look.85 Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy pointed out that
the parties had not asked the Jus-
tices to overrule Grutter v.
Bollinger,86 the 2003 case in
which the Court approved of the
University of Michigan Law
School’s consideration of race
among a constellation of other
diversity factors when making its
admissions decisions. Thus tak-
ing that ruling “as given for pur-
poses of deciding this case,”87
Justice Kennedy explained that
the Fifth Circuit had failed to
apply the level of scrutiny that
Grutter demands. The lower
court acted within Grutter’s
framework when it showed defer-
ence to the university’s conclusion that a racially diverse stu-
dent body was essential to its educational mission, Justice
Kennedy said, but the appellate court erred when it similarly
deferred to the university’s choice of means by which to achieve
that goal. The Fifth Circuit had limited its means-related
inquiry to determining merely whether the university’s decision
to use “‘race as a factor in admissions was made in good
faith.’”88 When it comes to assessing the university’s choice of
means, the Court held, “the University receives no deference.
. . . The reviewing court must ultimately be satisfied that no
workable race-neutral alternatives would produce the educa-
tional benefits of diversity.”89
In a lengthy concurrence, Justice Thomas reiterated his oppo-
sition to Grutter and argued that, if a court were to apply gen-
uine strict scrutiny, “it would require Texas either to close the
University or to stop discriminating against applicants based on
their race.”90 Justice Thomas drew parallels between the argu-
ments that the university advanced and the arguments that
defenders of racial segregation put forward in the 1950s. Justice
Ginsburg filed a lone dissent, stating that it was clear to her that
the university was acting fully within Grutter’s parameters.
PATENTS: HUMAN GENES
Can a patent be obtained on some of your genes once they
have been isolated from the surrounding DNA material in
which they appear? No, because those isolated genes remain
products of nature. Can a patent be obtained on synthetically
created DNA? Perhaps, because it is not naturally occurring. So
held the Court in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
79. Agency for Int’l Dev., 133 S. Ct. at 2328.
80. Id. at 2330; see also id. (“By requiring recipients to profess a spe-
cific belief, the [condition] goes beyond defining the limits of the
federally funded program to defining the recipient.”).
81. Id. at 2333 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 2335 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
83. 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
84. In the last year in which those two admissions methods were used,
for example, the University secured an entering class of under-
graduates that was 4.5 percent African-American and 16.9 percent
Hispanic.
85. Justice Kagan did not participate.
86. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
87. 133 S. Ct. at 2417. In a one-paragraph concurrence, Justice
Scalia—who continues to oppose Grutter—said that he “join[ed]
the Court’s opinion in full” for the very reason that the parties had
not asked the Court to revisit Grutter here. Id. at 2422 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
88. Id. at 2420 (quoting Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213,
236 (2011)).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2426 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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93. Id. at 2119. I say “potentially” because the Court stated in a foot-
note that it was not deciding whether the synthetically created
DNA at issue met the other requirements of patentability. See id.
at n.9. The Court merely held that the synthetically created DNA
was not a “product of nature” and so did not trip over that partic-
ular patent-law obstacle.
94. 133 S. Ct. 1441 (2013).
95. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (stating, in pertinent part, that the gov-
ernment waives its immunity from assault-and-battery claims
based upon the “acts or omissions of investigative or law enforce-
ment officers of the United States Government”).
96. Millbrook, 133 S. Ct. at 1446.
97. There were others. In Mutual Pharm. Co., Inc. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct.
2466 (2013), for example, the Court ruled 5-4 that the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act preempts “state-law design-defect
claims that turn on the adequacy of a drug’s warnings.” Id. at
2470.
98. 133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013).
99. Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. He also was joined in
relevant part by Justice Kennedy, who wrote separately to express
disagreement with the majority about the applicability of the pre-
sumption against preemption to federal legislation promulgated
under the Elections Clause. The majority found the presumption
inapplicable. Justice Kennedy cautioned against treating the Elec-
tions Clause differently from other constitutional delegations of
federal power. Justices Thomas and Alito filed separate dissents,
rejecting the majority’s finding of preemption.
100. See Marty Lederman, Pyrrhic Victory for Federal Government in
Arizona Voter Registration Case?, SCOTUSBLOG, June 17, 2013,
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/pyrrhic-victory-for-federal-
government-in-arizona-voter-registration-case (“This unani-
mous holding resolves a long-unresolved question about Con-
gress’s power to determine who may vote in federal elections. 
. . .”). Professor Lederman argues that a number of enacted and
proposed federal laws may now be constitutionally suspect. See,
e.g., id. (“The holding would . . . appear to preclude any future
efforts to enact a federal statute restricting state felon disenfran-
chisement laws.”).
101. Indeed, Arizona already sought such permission back in 2005,
but the EAC’s commissioners divided 2-2 on how to respond and
so the request was not approved. Arizona did not follow that
(in)action with a petition for judicial review. The Court stated
that it was not aware of any reason why Arizona could not refile
its request with the EAC, with the hope of securing a favorable
ruling.
Genetics, Inc.91 With respect to the
naturally occurring genes that Myr-
iad Genetics had isolated—genes
that are powerfully associated with
breast and ovarian cancer when
mutations occur within them—the
Court found that “Myriad did not
create anything. To be sure, it found
an important and useful gene [two
of them, actually], but separating
that gene from its surrounding
genetic material is not an act of
invention.”92 Myriad’s synthetically
created DNA material, however, was
potentially patentable because “the
lab technician unquestionably cre-
ates something new when [produc-
ing it].”93
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: THE LAW-ENFORCEMENT 
PROVISO
In Millbrook v. United States,94 the Court resolved a circuit
split concerning the “law enforcement proviso” of the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA).95 Kim Millbrook alleged that, while
in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, correctional
officers sexually assaulted him. He filed suit against the federal
government under the FTCA, which waives the government’s
sovereign immunity from a wide range of tort suits. The gov-
ernment claimed immunity, arguing that, under the statute’s
law-enforcement proviso, the government is liable for its law-
enforcement officers’ intentional torts only when those torts
occur in the course of executing a search, seizing evidence, or
making an arrest, none of which was the case here. The Third
Circuit accepted the government’s argument and dismissed the
case. The Court unanimously reversed and reinstated Mill-
brook’s claim, finding no basis in the statute’s plain text for the
Third Circuit’s interpretation. The Court held that the law-
enforcement proviso’s waiver of immunity “extends to acts or
omissions of law enforcement officers that arise within the
scope of their employment, regardless of whether the officers
are engaged in investigative or law enforcement activity, or are
executing a search, seizing evidence, or making an arrest.”96
SUPREMACY CLAUSE: PREEMPTION
VOTER REGISTRATION AND PROOF OF CITIZENSHIP
Three preemption rulings particularly merit mention.97 In
Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc.,98 the Court
found that the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 pre-
empted Arizona’s requirement that an individual present docu-
mentary proof of citizenship when registering to vote. The
nation’s standard voter-registration form requires an applicant
to swear under penalty of perjury that he or she is a United
States citizen. Arizona went further by demanding a copy of
the applicant’s passport, birth certificate, or other documentary
proof of citizenship. Led by Justice Scalia, a majority of the
Court found Arizona’s requirement preempted.99
Justice Scalia nevertheless explained for the majority that
the door is not necessarily closed on Arizona’s effort to insist
upon documentation of citizenship. The Court categorically
declared that the Elections Clause gives the states—not Con-
gress—the power to determine who may vote. (That is a sig-
nificant holding in its own right.100) The Court further
observed that, under federal law, a state may ask the federal
government’s Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to sup-
plement the standard voter-registration form with additional
requirements aimed at helping the state determine whether a
given applicant meets the state’s prescribed voter qualifica-
tions. Arizona can thus ask the EAC to amend the registration
form used in Arizona by requiring documentary proof of citi-
zenship.101 If the EAC refuses to approve the state’s request, the
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102. Noting that the EAC recently granted a comparable request by
Louisiana, the Court said that it might be arbitrary for the
agency to deny Arizona’s request.
103. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2260 n. 10. The
possibility of obtaining relief from the EAC led the Court to con-
clude that it did not yet need to resolve the constitutional issue.
In his dissent, Justice Thomas expressed strong sympathy for the
view that Arizona is constitutionally entitled to demand docu-
mentary proof of citizenship, but he stopped short of conclu-
sively embracing that position.
104. 133 S. Ct. 1391 (2013).
105. Id. at 1399.
106. Id. at 1405 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
107. 133 S. Ct. 1943 (2013).
108. 5 U.S.C. § 8705(a).
109. Hillman, 133 S. Ct. at 1950.
110. Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, reiterating his view
that preemption analysis should remain strictly confined to a
search for conflicts between the texts of state and federal laws.
Justice Alito similarly concurred in the judgment, arguing that
FEGLIA should not be accorded preemptive effect when (unlike
in this case) it is indisputably clear that the deceased did not
want his or her original beneficiary designation under FEGLIA
to be honored.
111. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
112. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
Court said, then the Administrative Procedures Act authorizes
the state to seek judicial review.102 In their separate dissents,
Justices Thomas and Alito pointed out the not-insignificant
complication that the EAC currently does not have any mem-
bers, and so might not be in the business of fielding states’
requests. The majority responded by suggesting that, if the
EAC remains defunct, Arizona “might” be able either to obtain
mandamus relief or “to assert a constitutional right to demand
concrete evidence of citizenship apart from the [standard fed-
eral form].”103
MEDICAID AND TORT RECOVERIES
In Wos v. E.M.A.,104 the Court held that a state’s 
irrebuttable, one-size-fits-all statutory presumption
[that a given percentage of a Medicaid beneficiary’s tort
recovery was allocated for medical expenses and thus is
owed to the state] is incompatible with the Medicaid
Act’s clear mandate that a State may not demand any por-
tion of a beneficiary’s tort recovery except the share that
is attributable to medical expenses.105
The Court thus found that federal law preempted North
Carolina’s irrebuttable presumption that one-third of a Medic-
aid beneficiary’s tort recovery was for medical costs. Joined by
Justices Scalia and Thomas, Chief Justice Roberts argued in
dissent that neither Congress nor the Department of Health
and Human Services had ever clearly stated “that segregating
medical expenses from a lump-sum recovery must be done on
a case-specific, after-the-fact basis, rather than pursuant to a
general rule spelled out in advance.”106
LIFE-INSURANCE BENEFICIARIES
In Hillman v. Maretta,107 all of the Justices agreed (albeit for
differing reasons) that the Federal Employees’ Group Life
Insurance Act (FEGLIA), which creates a life-insurance pro-
gram for federal employees, preempted a Virginia statutory
provision concerning the rightful ownership of life-insurance
proceeds. FEGLIA states that an employee may designate a
beneficiary “in a signed and witnessed writing” and that any
change of beneficiary must be made in writing and filed with
the federal government.108 A Virginia statute stated, however,
that divorce automatically terminates a life-insurance-benefi-
ciary designation benefiting the former spouse. The Virginia
legislation further stated that, if the termination-upon-divorce
provision were preempted, then the person who would have
received the insurance bene-
fits absent the preemption
had a cause of action against
the former spouse. Warren
Hillman (a federal employee)
designated his then-spouse
Judy Maretta as his FEGLIA
beneficiary, but he failed to
change the designation after
the marriage ended and he
married Jacqueline Hillman.
After Warren died and the
government paid the insur-
ance proceeds to Judy, Jacque-
line filed an action against her
pursuant to the Virginia
statute. The parties agreed
that FEGLIA preempted Virginia’s termination-upon-divorce
provision but disagreed about the fate of the provision that
purported to make Judy liable to Jacqueline for the proceeds
she had received.
Led by Justice Sotomayor, a majority of the Court found
that Virginia’s assignment of a cause of action to Jacqueline
conflicted with the policies and purposes underlying FEGLIA.
The Court reasoned that one of Congress’s purposes was to
ensure that the “duly named beneficiary will receive the insur-
ance benefits and be able to make use of them.”109 Because Vir-
ginia’s assignment of a cause of action undermined that federal
purpose, the Court found it preempted.110
TAKINGS: LAND-USE PERMITS
A well-known pair of sibling cases—Nollan111 and
Dolan112—operates to ensure that a governmental body cannot
use its power to grant or withhold land-use permits to get for
free what the Takings Clause would otherwise require it to pay
just compensation to obtain. Nollan and Dolan do that consti-
tutional work by establishing that a government cannot condi-
tion its approval of a land-use permit on the landowner’s will-
ingness to surrender an interest in his or her property, unless
there is a “nexus” and “rough proportionality” between the
condition that the government wishes to impose and the
effects that the landowner’s proposed new land use is expected
to have. The application of Nollan and Dolan to conditions
demanding the relinquishment of an interest in real property is
clear. But what if the government instead demands that the
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rights leaders have long regarded Sections 4 and 5 of the Act as
critical to the legislation’s success in helping to eradicate racial
discrimination in voting.
121. 557 U.S. 193 (2009).
122. Id. at 203.
landowner pay money? Do the
nexus and rough-proportionality
tests still apply?
Dividing 5-4 along familiar
lines, the Court answered that
question affirmatively in Koontz v.
St. Johns River Water Management
District.113 The government in that
case demanded that a permit
seeker either reduce the size of his
proposed development or pick up
the tab for mitigation projects
(such as replacing culverts or fill-
ing in ditches) on other properties
to which the landowner had no
connection. “Mindful of the spe-
cial vulnerability of land use permit applicants to extortionate
demands for money,” Justice Alito and his colleagues in the
majority concluded that Nollan and Dolan should apply to gov-
ernmental demands for real property and money alike.114 Writ-
ing for the dissenters, Justice Kagan argued that takings con-
cerns are absent when a government demands the payment of
money rather than the transfer of an interest in real property,
and she warned that the majority’s ruling threatens to “turn[]
a broad array of local land-use regulations into federal consti-
tutional questions.”115
TITLE VII
In a pair of rulings handed down on the final Monday of the
Term, the Court construed Title VII in ways that many employ-
ers are likely to celebrate and many employment-discrimina-
tion plaintiffs are likely to lament. 
In Vance v. Ball State University,116 with Justice Alito writing
for the majority, the Court ruled 5-4 that a person is a “super-
visor” for purposes of Title VII—and that his or her actions can
thus create vicarious liability for the employer under Title
VII—only when the person has been authorized by the
employer to make significant changes in the plaintiff’s employ-
ment status (such as by hiring, firing, demoting, or transfer-
ring the plaintiff).
In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nas-
sar,117 with Justice Kennedy writing for the majority, the Court
ruled 5-4 that a plaintiff bringing a retaliation claim against an
employer under Title VII must prove that retaliation for the
plaintiff’s opposition to workplace discrimination was a but-for
cause of the adverse employment action that he or she suf-
fered. Based on its reading of the text, structure, and history of
Title VII, the Court refused to adopt the lesser requirement
that a plaintiff prove only that retaliation was one of multiple
motivating factors for the employer’s actions.
Joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, Justice
Ginsburg dissented in both cases. In Vance, she argued that the
Court’s precedents made clear that “harassment by an
employee with power to direct subordinates’ day-to-day work
activities should trigger vicarious employer liability.”118 In
Nassar, she argued that the majority had undermined Con-
gress’s effort to provide employees with strong protection
against retaliation for trying to vindicate their workplace
rights. Justice Ginsburg closed both of her dissents with a plea
to Congress to restore what she believed was Title VII’s
intended meaning.
VOTING RIGHTS ACT: SECTION 4 AND PRECLEARANCE
In its penultimate public session of the Term, a closely
divided Court in Shelby County v. Holder119 produced a monu-
mental ruling on the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (the Act). Sec-
tion 5 of the Act required certain states and localities to obtain
the approval of the United States Attorney General or a three-
judge federal court before making any changes in their voting
laws or procedures. The point of the preclearance requirement
was to ensure that a given jurisdiction’s proposed changes did
not serve as intended or unintended vehicles for racial discrim-
ination in that jurisdiction’s electoral affairs. Section 4 provided
the coverage formula for determining which states and locali-
ties were subject to Section 5’s preclearance requirement.120 As
it had for roughly four decades, Section 4 targeted jurisdictions
based on data (such as voter-registration and voter-turnout fig-
ures) from the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 2006, opting to
leave that coverage formula unchanged, Congress extended the
Act’s preclearance regime for an additional 25 years.
The Court in Shelby County declared Section 4’s coverage
formula unconstitutional. Writing for the five-member major-
ity, Chief Justice Roberts repeatedly invoked the opinion he
wrote for the Court four years earlier in Northwest Austin
Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder.121 In that case, the
Court in dictum had expressed skepticism about the constitu-
tionality of the Act’s preclearance system, stating that “the Act
imposes current burdens and must be justified by current
needs.”122 Congress took no action in the interim, however,
and the Shelby County Court concluded that the time had come
for the Justices to respond.
Chief Justice Roberts stated that the Act’s preclearance
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regime sat in strong tension with two constitutional principles:
states ordinarily regulate their own elections and the federal
government ordinarily must treat the states as “equal sover-
eign[s],” making no distinctions between them.123 Under the
Act, the Court explained, “[s]tates must beseech the Federal
Government for permission to implement laws that they
would otherwise have the right to enact and execute on their
own,”124 and nine states and several additional jurisdictions
are singled out for a preclearance requirement that other states
and localities can wholly ignore. Chief Justice Roberts said that
Section 4’s coverage formula “is based on decades-old data and
eradicated practices,”125 pointing out, for example, that in the
covered jurisdictions today, there no longer is any significant
difference in voter-turnout rates among whites and African-
Americans. The Court stopped short of striking down Section
5’s preclearance requirement,126 but held that Section 5 must
remain idle unless and until Congress devises a coverage for-
mula “based on current conditions.”127
Joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, Justice
Ginsburg dissented. Invoking mere rationality review,128 she
argued that Congress had gone to extraordinary lengths in
2006 to assess the continuing problem of racial discrimination
in the jurisdictions captured by Section 4’s coverage formula,
and that the factual record made it clear—including in Shelby
County itself—that Congress had ample reasons to keep Sec-
tion 4’s coverage formula in force. “Throwing out preclearance
when it has worked and is continuing to work to stop dis-
criminatory changes,” she wrote, “is like throwing away your
umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not getting wet.”129
OTHER NOTABLE RULINGS
In Maracich v. Spears,130 the Court held that the Driver’s Pri-
vacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA) does not permit attorneys
to obtain or use individuals’ personal information from a state’s
department of motor vehicles for the “predominant purpose”
of soliciting possible clients. In an opinion by Justice Kennedy,
the majority found that allowing attorneys to use drivers’ per-
sonal information to solicit clients would substantially under-
mine Congress’s goal of protecting individuals’ privacy.
In McBurney v. Young,131 the Court unanimously held that
neither the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV nor
the dormant Commerce Clause barred Virginia from limiting
the benefits of its Freedom of Information Act to Virginia citi-
zens.
In Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl,132 the Court construed key
provisions of the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978 in favor of
a non-Indian couple who had
adopted a girl of partially Indian
descent, and against the girl’s
biological father, who initially
showed no interest in acting as
the girl’s parent and who had
never had custody of the child
until, in the girl’s 27th month, a
state court ordered the adoptive
couple to transfer the child to
him.
In Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut
Retirement Plans and Trust
Funds, 133 the Court held that
proof of the materiality of a defendant’s alleged misrepresenta-
tions is not a prerequisite to class certification in a federal secu-
rities-fraud action. Amgen had taken the contrary position,
arguing that proof of materiality at the class-certification stage
is necessary to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirement that “ques-
tions of law or fact common to class members predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members.” The
Court explained that because the issue of materiality is adjudi-
cated under an objective standard, the issue’s resolution is cer-
tain to be common to all class members.
In FTC v. Actavis, Inc.,134 the Court helped to clear the way
for the Federal Trade Commission to bring antitrust actions
against patent holders and alleged patent infringers (usually, if
not always, the makers of brand-name and generic pharma-
ceuticals, respectively) who enter into “pay to delay” (or
“reverse payment”) agreements. In such an agreement, an
alleged patent infringer agrees to accept financial payment
from the patent holder in exchange for delaying its effort to
bring the allegedly infringing product to market.
In Lefemine v. Wideman,135 the Court held that obtaining an
injunction ordering a defendant to comply with the Constitu-
tion can be sufficient to change the legal relationship between
the litigants and thereby render the plaintiff a “prevailing
party” entitled to attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
LOOKING AHEAD
The Court will tackle a number of interesting and broadly
consequential issues next Term. In one of its most widely
anticipated cases, the Court in NLRB v. Noel Canning136 will
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take up an ongoing battle between the White House and some
in the Senate concerning the ability of the President to make
recess appointments during recesses that occur within a single
enumerated session of the Senate, to make recess appoint-
ments to fill vacancies that exist (but did not arise) during a
recess, and to make recess appointments when the Senate is
convening every three days in pro forma sessions.
Affirmative action will make another prominent appearance
on the Court’s docket, when the Court in Schuette v. Coalition
to Defend Affirmative Action137 considers the constitutionality
of Michigan’s ban on the use of race and sex in admissions
decisions at that state’s public colleges and universities.
Campaign finance will also likely return to the headlines,
when the Court in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commis-
sion138 considers the constitutionality of the Bipartisan Cam-
paign Reform Act’s biennial limits on how much money a per-
son can contribute to federal political candidates and to non-
candidate committees.
The Court will have an opportunity in Town of Greece v. Gal-
loway139—a case involving prayers at legislative sessions—to
bring greater clarity to its famously tangled Establishment
Clause jurisprudence.
In McCullen v. Coakley,140 the Court will consider whether
Massachusetts has committed viewpoint discrimination in vio-
lation of the First Amendment’s Speech Clause by the way in
which it regulates who may enter and speak in areas located
near the entrances to abortion-performing clinics.
In Bond v. United States141—a case involving the Chemical
Weapons Convention, alleged marital infidelities, and the
malicious placement of harmful chemicals on mailboxes and
doorknobs—the Court will be asked to decide whether the
Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act reaches
the petitioner’s conduct and, if it does, whether Congress
exceeded its delegated powers by (on the petitioner’s account)
authorizing federal criminal prosecutions for conduct that the
Constitution reserves for state and local officials to address.
In Madigan v. Levin,142 the Court will confront a circuit split
on whether employees of state and local governments may
avoid the remedial regime set forth in the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act by bringing age-discrimination actions
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Equal Protection Clause.
Those who enjoy the complexities of federal jurisdictional
law will find at least five cases to celebrate next Term. In one of
multiple consumer-protection actions across the country alleg-
ing price-fixing by makers of liquid-crystal display (LCD) pan-
els, the Court in Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp.143
will be asked to resolve a circuit split on whether a state’s parens
patriae action is removable to federal court as a “mass action”
under the Class Action Fairness Act. In Atlantic Marine Con-
struction Co. v. United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Texas,144 the Court will consider the degree to which fed-
eral courts and litigants are bound by forum-selection agree-
ments. In Sprint Communications Co. v. Jacobs,145 the Court will
take on the task of clarifying the application of Younger absten-
tion in civil cases.146 In a sequel to Kiobel, the Court in Daim-
lerChrysler AG v. Bauman147 will determine whether a foreign
corporation may be sued in the United States under the Alien
Tort Statute based solely on the presence in this country of one
of that corporation’s subsidiaries. In Walden v. Fiore,148 the
Court will determine whether the Constitution and the general
federal-venue statute permit a Georgia police officer to be sued
in Nevada for conduct in which he allegedly engaged in Geor-
gia after confronting the plaintiffs on suspicion of drug activity
at Atlanta’s Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport.
Other issues on the Court’s docket for the coming Term
include the standing requirements for bringing a false-adver-
tising claim under the Lanham Act;149 the cognizability of dis-
parate-impact claims under the Fair Housing Act;150 the con-
ditions under which airlines and their employees enjoy immu-
nity under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act when
reporting potential security threats to the Transportation Secu-
rity Administration;151 and a trio of cases concerning the Secu-
rities Litigation Uniform Standards Act,152 among many others.
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